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'''Keywords''': cyberbiosecurity, bioeconomy, biosecurity, biomanufacturing, cybersecurity, cyber-physical security, supply chain
'''Keywords''': cyberbiosecurity, bioeconomy, biosecurity, biomanufacturing, cybersecurity, cyber-physical security, supply chain


==Introduction==
We propose “cyberbiosecurity” as an emerging hybridized discipline at the interface of cybersecurity, cyber-physical security, and biosecurity. Initially, we define this term as “understanding the vulnerabilities to unwanted surveillance, intrusions, and malicious and harmful activities which can occur within or at the interfaces of commingled life and medical sciences, cyber, cyber-physical, supply chain, and infrastructure systems, and developing and instituting measures to prevent, protect against, mitigate, investigate, and attribute such threats as it pertains to security, competitiveness, and resilience.” We emphasize this is an initial definition; we fully expect that the definition and the landscape will rapidly evolve, requiring the definition to be revised. We also contend that, because of its diversity and extent, cyberbiosecurity needs its own systematics, so that it can be better communicated, organized, explored, advanced, and implemented. Here, we also posit that cyberbiosecurity contributes to a larger strategic objective of “safeguarding the bioeconomy,”<ref name="NASEMMeeting14">{{cite book |title=Meeting Recap: Workshop - Convergence: Safeguarding Technology in the Bioeconomy |author=Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology; Board on Life Sciences |publisher=The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine |year=2014}}</ref> a concept advanced in the U.S. which seeks to increase security and resilience of the bioeconomy to protect its rapidly changing cyber-life science topology.
Thus far, what we are proposing to call cyberbiosecurity has primarily been initiated out of two principal sets of activities. The first set of activities involved a study<ref name="AAASNat14">{{cite web |url=http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/AAAS-FBI-UNICRI_Big_Data_Report_111014.pdf |format=PDF |title=National and Transnational Security Implications of Big Data in the Life Sciences |author=FBI WMD Directorate, American Association for the Advancement of Science, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute |publisher=AAAS |date=2014}}</ref> and three workshops<ref name="NASEMMeeting14" /><ref name="NASEMSafe15">{{cite book |url=https://www.ehidc.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/Safeguarding%20the%20Bioeconomy_II_Recap%20Final%20090815.pdf |format=PDF |title=Meeting Recap: Safeguarding the Bioeconomy: Applications and Implications of Emerging Science |author=Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology |publisher=The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine |year=2015}}</ref><ref name="NASEMSafe16">{{cite book |url=https://www.ibpforum.org/sites/default/files/Safeguarding_the_Bioeconomy_III_Recap.pdf |format=PDF |title=Meeting Recap: Safeguarding the Bioeconomy III: Securing Life Sciences Data |author=Board on Life Sciences and Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology |publisher=The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine |year=2016 |url=https://www.ibpforum.org/sites/default/files/Safeguarding_the_Bioeconomy_III_Recap.pdf |format=PDF}}</ref>, which were primarily focused on security issues with respect to “big data” and the relationship with the “bioeconomy.” The second set was a first-ever systems analysis of a biomanufacturing facility, which expands the view to include a different “target set” and approach to understanding vulnerabilities with sharp acuity. This tasked study was conducted to comprehensively understand the vulnerabilities with respect to a wide range of unwanted intrusions and nefarious activities in the life science, cyber, cyber-physical, infrastructure, and supply chain aspects, and determine what measures could be taken or developed and implemented to anticipate, detect, identify, prevent, mitigate, respond to, and attribute such potential exploitation. The first published paper on cyberbiosecurity primarily focuses on the security of the biotechnology interface with cyberspace.<ref name="PeccoudCyber18">{{cite journal |title=Cyberbiosecurity: From Naive Trust to Risk Awareness |journal=Trends in Biotechnology |author=Peccoud, J.; Gallegos, J.E.; Murch, R. et al. |volume=36 |issue=1 |pages=4–7 |year=2018 |doi=10.1016/j.tibtech.2017.10.012 |pmid=29224719}}</ref> In addition to the system analysis as part of the second set, a small workshop was held in the U.S. that sought to scope and stimulate interest in the government, academic, corporate, and non-profit sectors, create a core constituency, understand what topics and themes could constitute cyberbiosecurity, identify priorities, and begin to develop a campaign and timeline. The workshop was highly successful. These endeavors, together with additional recent activities and publications<ref name="KozminskiBio15">{{cite journal |title=Biosecurity in the age of Big Data: A conversation with the FBI |journal=Molecular Biology of the Cell |author=Kozminski, K.G.; Drubin, D.G. |volume=26 |issue=22 |pages=3894–97 |year=2015 |doi=10.1091/mbc.E14-01-0027 |pmid=26543195 |pmc=PMC4710219}}</ref><ref name="PauwelsHow16">{{cite web |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/how-our-unhealthy-cybersecurity-infrastructure-hurting-biotechnology |title=How Our Unhealthy Cybersecurity Infrastructure Is Hurting Biotechnology |author=Pauwels, E.; Vidyarthi, A. |work=Wilson Briefs |publisher=Wilson Center |date=29 March 2016}}</ref><ref name="PauwelsWho17">{{cite web |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/who-will-own-the-secrets-our-genes-us-china-race-artificial-intelligence-and-genomics |title=Who Will Own The Secrets In Our Genes? A U.S. – China Race in Artificial Intelligence and Genomics |author=Pauwels, E.; Vidyarthi, A. |work=Wilson Briefs |publisher=Wilson Center |date=19 November 2017}}</ref><ref name="PauwelsTheInt17">{{cite web |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-intelligent-and-connected-bio-labs-the-future-promise-and-peril-the-fourth |title=The Intelligent and Connected Bio-Labs of the Future: Promise and Peril in the Fourth Industrial Revolution |author=Pauwels, E.; Dunlap, E. |work=Wilson Briefs |publisher=Wilson Center |date=07 September 2017}}</ref>,  have added to scoping the future of cyberbiosecurity yet to come.


==References==
==References==

Revision as of 17:42, 22 April 2019

Full article title Cyberbiosecurity: An emerging new discipline to help safeguard the bioeconomy
Journal Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology
Author(s) Murch, Randall S.; So, William K.; Buchholz, Wallace G.; Raman, Sanjay; Peccoud, Jean
Author affiliation(s) Virginia Tech, Federal Bureau of Investigation, University of Nebraska, Colorado State University
Primary contact Email: rmurch at vt dot edu
Editors Berns, Kenneth I.
Year published 2019
Volume and issue 6
Page(s) 39
DOI 10.3389/fbioe.2018.00039
ISSN 2296-4185
Distribution license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Website https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbioe.2018.00039/full
Download https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbioe.2018.00039/pdf (PDF)

Abstract

Cyberbiosecurity is being proposed as a formal new enterprise which encompasses cybersecurity, cyber-physical security, and biosecurity as applied to biological and biomedical-based systems. In recent years, an array of important meetings and public discussions, commentaries, and publications have occurred that highlight numerous vulnerabilities. While necessary first steps, they do not provide a systematized structure for effectively promoting communication, education and training, elucidation, and prioritization for analysis, research, development, testing and evaluation, and implementation of scientific and technological standards of practice, policy, or regulatory or legal considerations for protecting the bioeconomy. Further, experts in biosecurity and cybersecurity are generally not aware of each other's domains, expertise, perspectives, priorities, or where mutually supported opportunities exist for which positive outcomes could result. Creating, promoting, and advancing a new discipline can assist with formal, beneficial, and continuing engagements. Recent key activities and publications that inform the creation of cyberbiosecurity are briefly reviewed, as is the expansion of cyberbiosecurity to include biomanufacturing, which is supported by a rigorous analysis of a biomanufacturing facility. Recommendations are provided to initialize cyberbiosecurity and place it on a trajectory to establish a structured and sustainable discipline, forum, and enterprise.

Keywords: cyberbiosecurity, bioeconomy, biosecurity, biomanufacturing, cybersecurity, cyber-physical security, supply chain

Introduction

We propose “cyberbiosecurity” as an emerging hybridized discipline at the interface of cybersecurity, cyber-physical security, and biosecurity. Initially, we define this term as “understanding the vulnerabilities to unwanted surveillance, intrusions, and malicious and harmful activities which can occur within or at the interfaces of commingled life and medical sciences, cyber, cyber-physical, supply chain, and infrastructure systems, and developing and instituting measures to prevent, protect against, mitigate, investigate, and attribute such threats as it pertains to security, competitiveness, and resilience.” We emphasize this is an initial definition; we fully expect that the definition and the landscape will rapidly evolve, requiring the definition to be revised. We also contend that, because of its diversity and extent, cyberbiosecurity needs its own systematics, so that it can be better communicated, organized, explored, advanced, and implemented. Here, we also posit that cyberbiosecurity contributes to a larger strategic objective of “safeguarding the bioeconomy,”[1] a concept advanced in the U.S. which seeks to increase security and resilience of the bioeconomy to protect its rapidly changing cyber-life science topology.

Thus far, what we are proposing to call cyberbiosecurity has primarily been initiated out of two principal sets of activities. The first set of activities involved a study[2] and three workshops[1][3][4], which were primarily focused on security issues with respect to “big data” and the relationship with the “bioeconomy.” The second set was a first-ever systems analysis of a biomanufacturing facility, which expands the view to include a different “target set” and approach to understanding vulnerabilities with sharp acuity. This tasked study was conducted to comprehensively understand the vulnerabilities with respect to a wide range of unwanted intrusions and nefarious activities in the life science, cyber, cyber-physical, infrastructure, and supply chain aspects, and determine what measures could be taken or developed and implemented to anticipate, detect, identify, prevent, mitigate, respond to, and attribute such potential exploitation. The first published paper on cyberbiosecurity primarily focuses on the security of the biotechnology interface with cyberspace.[5] In addition to the system analysis as part of the second set, a small workshop was held in the U.S. that sought to scope and stimulate interest in the government, academic, corporate, and non-profit sectors, create a core constituency, understand what topics and themes could constitute cyberbiosecurity, identify priorities, and begin to develop a campaign and timeline. The workshop was highly successful. These endeavors, together with additional recent activities and publications[6][7][8][9], have added to scoping the future of cyberbiosecurity yet to come.

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology; Board on Life Sciences (2014). Meeting Recap: Workshop - Convergence: Safeguarding Technology in the Bioeconomy. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 
  2. FBI WMD Directorate, American Association for the Advancement of Science, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (2014). "National and Transnational Security Implications of Big Data in the Life Sciences" (PDF). AAAS. http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/AAAS-FBI-UNICRI_Big_Data_Report_111014.pdf. 
  3. Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology (2015) (PDF). Meeting Recap: Safeguarding the Bioeconomy: Applications and Implications of Emerging Science. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. https://www.ehidc.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/Safeguarding%20the%20Bioeconomy_II_Recap%20Final%20090815.pdf. 
  4. Board on Life Sciences and Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology (2016) (PDF). Meeting Recap: Safeguarding the Bioeconomy III: Securing Life Sciences Data. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. https://www.ibpforum.org/sites/default/files/Safeguarding_the_Bioeconomy_III_Recap.pdf. 
  5. Peccoud, J.; Gallegos, J.E.; Murch, R. et al. (2018). "Cyberbiosecurity: From Naive Trust to Risk Awareness". Trends in Biotechnology 36 (1): 4–7. doi:10.1016/j.tibtech.2017.10.012. PMID 29224719. 
  6. Kozminski, K.G.; Drubin, D.G. (2015). "Biosecurity in the age of Big Data: A conversation with the FBI". Molecular Biology of the Cell 26 (22): 3894–97. doi:10.1091/mbc.E14-01-0027. PMC PMC4710219. PMID 26543195. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4710219. 
  7. Pauwels, E.; Vidyarthi, A. (29 March 2016). "How Our Unhealthy Cybersecurity Infrastructure Is Hurting Biotechnology". Wilson Briefs. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/how-our-unhealthy-cybersecurity-infrastructure-hurting-biotechnology. 
  8. Pauwels, E.; Vidyarthi, A. (19 November 2017). "Who Will Own The Secrets In Our Genes? A U.S. – China Race in Artificial Intelligence and Genomics". Wilson Briefs. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/who-will-own-the-secrets-our-genes-us-china-race-artificial-intelligence-and-genomics. 
  9. Pauwels, E.; Dunlap, E. (7 September 2017). "The Intelligent and Connected Bio-Labs of the Future: Promise and Peril in the Fourth Industrial Revolution". Wilson Briefs. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-intelligent-and-connected-bio-labs-the-future-promise-and-peril-the-fourth. 

Notes

This presentation is faithful to the original, with only a few minor changes to presentation, grammar, and punctuation. In some cases important information was missing from the references, and that information was added.