Difference between revisions of "Journal:Next steps for access to safe, secure DNA synthesis"
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|Full article title||Next steps for access to safe, secure DNA synthesis|
|Journal||Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology|
|Author(s)||Diggans, James; Leproust, Emily|
|Author affiliation(s)||Twist Bioscience Corporation|
|Primary contact||Email: jdiggans at twistbioscience dot com|
|Editors||Morse, Stephen Allen|
|Volume and issue||7|
|Distribution license||Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International|
|This article should not be considered complete until this message box has been removed. This is a work in progress.|
The DNA synthesis industry has, since the invention of gene-length synthesis, worked proactively to ensure synthesis is carried out securely and safely. Informed by guidance from the U.S. government, several of these companies have collaborated over the last decade to produce a set of best practices for customer and sequence screening prior to manufacture. Taken together, these practices ensure that synthetic DNA is used to advance research that is designed and intended for public benefit. With increasing scale in the industry and expanding capability in the synthetic biology toolset, it is worth revisiting current practices to evaluate additional measures to ensure the continued safety and wide availability of DNA synthesis. Here we encourage specific steps, in part derived from successes in the cybersecurity community, that can ensure synthesis screening systems stay well ahead of emerging challenges, to continue to enable responsible research advances. Gene synthesis companies, science and technology funders, policymakers, and the scientific community as a whole have a shared duty to continue to minimize risk and maximize the safety and security of DNA synthesis to further power world-changing developments in advanced biological manufacturing, agriculture, drug development, healthcare, and energy.
Keywords: biosecurity, synthetic biology, DNA, cyberbiosecurity, policy
All authors listed have made a substantial, direct and intellectual contribution to the work, and approved it for publication.
This work was funded by Twist Bioscience Corporation.
Conflict of interest statement
JD and EL are employed by Twist Bioscience. Twist Bioscience is a board member of the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC). The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the IGSC.
This presentation is faithful to the original, with only a few minor changes to presentation, grammar, and punctuation. In some cases important information was missing from the references, and that information was added. The original article listed references alphabetically; this version, by design, lists them in order of appearance.